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Abstract
In the random deletion channel, each bit is deleted independently with probability p. For the
random deletion channel, the existence of codes of rate (1− p)/9, and thus bounded away from 0
for any p < 1, has been known. We give an explicit construction with polynomial time encoding
and deletion correction algorithms with rate c0(1− p) for an absolute constant c0 > 0.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of designing error-correcting codes for reliable and efficient com-
munication on the binary deletion channel. The binary deletion channel (BDC) deletes
each transmitted bit independently with probability p, for some p ∈ (0, 1) which we call the
deletion probability. Crucially, the location of the deleted bits are not known at the decoder,
who receives a subsequence of the original transmitted sequence. The loss of synchronization
in symbol locations makes the noise model of deletions challenging to cope with. As one
indication of this, we still do not know the channel capacity of the binary deletion channel.
Quoting from the first page of Mitzenmacher’s survey [17]: “Currently, we have no closed-form
expression for the capacity, nor do we have an efficient algorithmic means to numerically
compute this capacity.” This is in sharp contrast with the noise model of bit erasures, where
each bit is independently replaced by a ’?’ with probability p (the binary erasure channel
(BEC)), or of bit errors, where each bit is flipped independently with probability p (the
binary symmetric channel (BSC)). The capacity of the BEC and BSC equal 1−p and 1−h(p)
respectively, and we know codes of polynomial complexity with rate approaching the capacity
in each case.
The capacity of the binary deletion channel is clearly at most 1− p, the capacity of the
simpler binary erasure channel. Diggavi and Grossglauser [3] establish that the capacity of
the deletion channel for p ≤ 12 is at least 1 − h(p). Kalai, Mitzenmacher, and Sudan [11]
proved this lower bound is tight as p → 0, and Kanoria and Montanari [12] determined a
series expansion that can be used to determine the capacity exactly. Turning to large p,
Rahmati and Duman [18] prove that the capacity is at most 0.4143(1 − p) for p ≥ 0.65.
Drinea and Mitzenmacher [4, 5] proved that the capacity of the BDC is at least (1− p)/9,
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which is within a constant factor of the upper bound. In particular, the capacity is positive
for every p < 1, which is perhaps surprising. The asymptotic behavior of the capacity of the
BDC at both extremes of p→ 0 and p→ 1 is thus known.
This work is concerned with constructive results for coding for the binary deletion channel.
That is, we seek codes that can be constructed, encoded, and decoded from deletions caused
by the BDC, in polynomial time. Recently, there has been good progress on codes for
adversarial deletions, including constructive results. Here the model is that the channel can
delete an arbitrary subset of pn bits in the n-bit codeword. A code capable of correcting
pn worst-case deletions can clearly also correct deletions caused by a BDC with deletion
probability (p − ) with high probability, so one can infer results for the BDC from some
results for worst-case deletions. For small p, Guruswami and Wang [9] constructed binary
codes of rate 1−O(√p) to efficiently correct a p fraction worst-case deletions. So this also
gives codes of rate approaching 1 for the BDC when p→ 0. For larger p, Kash et al. [13]
proved that randomly chosen codes of small enough rate R > 0 can correctly decode against
pn adversarial deletions when p ≤ 0.17. Even non-constructively, this remained the best
achievability result in terms of correctable deletion fraction until the recent work of Bukh,
Guruswami, and Håstad [2] who constructed codes of positive rate efficiently decodable
against pn adversarial deletions for any p <
√
2− 1. For adversarial deletions, it is impossible
to correct a deletion fraction of 1/2, whereas the capacity of the BDC is positive for all p < 1.
So solving the problem for the much harder worst-case deletions is not a viable approach to
construct positive rate codes for the BDC for p > 1/2.
To the best of our knowledge, explicit efficiently decodable code constructions were not
available for the binary deletion channel for arbitrary p < 1. We present such a construction
in this work. Our rate is worse than the (1 − p)/9 achieved non-constructively, but has
asymptotically the same dependence on p for p→ 1.
I Theorem 1. Let p ∈ (0, 1). There is an explicit a family of binary codes that (1) has rate
(1− p)/110, (2) is constructible in polynomial time, (3) encodable in time O(N), and (3)
decodable with high probability on the binary deletion channel with deletion probability p in
time O(N2). (Here N is the block length of the code)
1.1 Some other related work
One work that considers efficient recovery against random deletions is by Yazdi and Dolecek
[20]. In their setting, two parties Alice and Bob are connected by a two-way communication
channel. Alice has a string X, Bob has string Y obtained by passing X through a binary
deletion channel with deletion probability p 1, and Bob must recover X. They produce a
polynomial-time synchronization scheme that transmits a total of O(pn log(1/p)) bits and
allows Bob to recover X with probability exponentially approaching 1.
For other models of random synchronization errors, Kirsch and Drinea [14] prove inform-
ation capacity lower bounds for channels with i.i.d deletions and duplications. Fertonani
et al. [6] prove capacity bounds for binary channels with i.i.d insertions, deletions, and
substitutions.
For deletion channels over non-binary alphabets, Rahmati and Duman [18] prove a
capacity upper bound of C2(p) + (1− p) log(|Σ|/2), where C2(p) denotes the capacity of the
binary deletion channel with deletion probability p, when the alphabet size |Σ| is even. In
particular, using the best known bound for C2(p) of C2(p) ≤ 0.4143(1− p), the upper bound
is (1− p)(log |Σ| − 0.5857).
In [8], the authors of this paper consider the model of oblivious deletions, which is in
between the BDC and adversarial deletions in power. Here, the channel can delete any pn
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bits of the codeword, but must do so without knowledge of the codeword. In this model, they
prove the existence of codes of positive rate for correcting any fraction p < 1 of oblivious
deletions.
1.2 Our construction approach
Our construction concatenates a high rate outer code over a large alphabet that is efficiently
decodable against a small fraction of adversarial insertions and deletions, with a good inner
binary code. For the outer code, we can use the recent construction of [10]. To construct the
inner code, we first choose a binary code correcting a small fraction of adversarial deletions.
By concentration bounds, duplicating bits of a codeword in a disciplined manner is effective
against the random deletion channel, so we, for some constant B, duplicate every bit of
the binary code B/(1− p) times. We further ensure our initial binary code has only runs
of length 1 and 2 to maximize the effectiveness of duplication. We add small buffers of 0s
between inner codewords to facilitate decoding.
One might wonder whether it would be possible to use Drinea and Mitzenmacher’s
existential result [4, 5] of a (1 − p)/9 capacity lower bound as a black box inner code to
achieve a better rate together with efficient decodability. We discuss this approach in §3.2
and elaborate on what makes such a construction difficult to implement.
2 Preliminaries
General Notation. Throughout the paper, log x refers to the base-2 logarithm. We use
interval notation [a, b] = {a, a+ 1, . . . , b} to denote intervals of integers, and we use [a] =
[1, a] = {1, 2, . . . , a}. Let Binomial(n, p) denote the Binomial distribution.
Words. A word is a sequence of symbols from some alphabet. We denote explicit words
using angle brackets, like 〈01011〉. We denote string concatenation of two words w and w′
with ww′. We denote wk = ww · · ·w where there are k concatenated copies of w.
A subsequence of a word w is a word obtained by removing some (possibly none) of the
symbols in w.
Let ∆i/d(w1, w2) denote the insertion/deletion distance between w1 and w2, i.e. the
minimum number of insertions and deletions needed to transform w1 into w2. By a lemma
due to Levenshtein [15], this is equal to |w1|+ |w2| − 2 LCS(w1, w2), where LCS denotes the
length of the longest common subsequence.
Define a run of a word w to be a maximal single-symbol subword. That is, a subword w′
in w consisting of a single symbol such that any longer subword containing w′ has at least
two different symbols. Note the runs of a word partition the word. For example, 110001 has
3 runs: one run of 0s and two runs of 1s.
We say that c ∈ {0, 1}m and c′ ∈ {0, 1}m are confusable under δm deletions if it is
possible to apply δm deletions to c and c′ and obtain the same result. If δ is understood, we
simply say c and c′ are confusable.
Concentration Bounds. We use the following forms of Chernoff bound.
I Lemma 2 (Chernoff). Let A1, . . . , An be i.i.d random variables taking values in [0, 1]. Let
A =
∑n
i=1Ai and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
Pr[A ≤ (1− δ)E[A]] ≤ exp (−δ2 E[A]/2) (1)
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Furthermore,
Pr[A ≥ (1 + δ)E[A]] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)E[A]
. (2)
We also have the following corollary, whose proof is in Appendix A.
I Lemma 3. Let 0 < α < β. Let A1, . . . , An be independent random variables taking values
in [0, β] such that, for all i, E[Ai] ≤ α. For γ ∈ [α, 2α], we have
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Ai ≥ nγ
]
≤ exp
(
− (γ − α)
2n
3αβ
)
. (3)
3 Efficiently decodable codes for random deletions with p
approaching 1
3.1 Construction
We present a family of constant rate codes that decodes with high probability on a binary
deletion channel with deletion fraction p (BDCp). These codes have rate c0(1 − p) for an
absolute positive constant c0, which is within a constant of the upper bound (1− p), which
even holds for the erasure channel. By Drinea and Mitzenmacher [4] the maximum known
rate of a non-efficiently correctable binary deletion channel code is (1− p)/9.
The construction is based on the intuition that deterministic codes are better than random
codes for the deletion channel. Indeed, for adversarial deletions, length n random codes
correct at most 0.22n deletions [13], while explicitly constructed codes can correct close to
(
√
2− 1)n deletions [2].
We begin by borrowing a result from [9].
I Lemma 4 (Corollary of Lemma 2.3 of [9]). Let 0 < δ < 12 . For every binary string
c ∈ {0, 1}m, there are at most δm( m(1−δ)m)2 strings c′ ∈ {0, 1}m such that c and c′ are
confusable under δm deletions.
The next lemma gives codes against a small fraction of adversarial deletions with an additional
run-length constraint on the codewords.
I Lemma 5. Let δ > 0. There exists a length m binary code of rate R = 0.6942− 2h(δ)−
O(log(δm)/m) correcting a δ fraction of adversarial insertions and deletions such that each
codeword contains only runs of size 1 and 2. Furthermore this code is constructible in time
O˜(2(0.6942+R)m).
Proof. It is easy to show that the number of codewords with only runs of 1 and 2 is Fm,
the mth Fibonacci number, and it is well known that Fm = ϕm + o(1) ≈ 20.6942m where ϕ
is the golden ratio. Now we construct the code by choosing it greedily. Each codeword is
confusable with at most δm
(
m
(1−δ)m
)2 other codewords, so the number of codewords we can
choose is at least
20.6942m
δm
(
m
(1−δ)m
)2 = 2m(0.6942−2h(δ)−O(log(δm)/m)). (4)
We can find all words of length m whose run lengths are only 1 and 2 by recursion in time
O(Fm) = O(20.6942m). Running the greedy algorithm, we need to, for at most Fm · 2Rm pairs
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of such words, determine whether the pair is confusable (we only need to check confusability
of a candidate word with words already added to the code). Checking confusability of
two words under adversarial deletions reduces to checking whether the longest common
subsequence is at least (1− δ)m, which can be done in time O(m2). This gives an overall
runtime of O(m2 · Fm · 2Rm) = O˜(2(0.6942+R)m). J
I Corollary 6. There exists a constant m∗0 such that for all m ≥ m∗0, there exists a length m
binary code of rate Rin = 0.555 correcting a δin = 0.0083 fraction of adversarial insertions
and deletions such that each codeword contains runs of size 1 and 2 only and each codeword
starts and ends with a 1. Furthermore this code is constructible in time O(21.25m).
Our construction utilizes the following result as a black box for efficiently coding against
an arbitrary fraction of insertions and deletions with rate approaching capacity.
I Theorem 7 (Theorem 1.1 of [10]). For any 0 ≤ δ < 1 and  > 0, there exists a code C
over alphabet Σ, with |Σ| = poly(1/), with block length n, rate 1− δ − , and is efficiently
decodable from δn insertions and deletions. The code can be constructed in time poly(n),
encoded in time O(n), and decoded in time O(n2).
We apply Theorem 7 for small δ, so we also could use the high rate binary code construction
of [7] as an outer code.
We now turn to our code construction for Theorem 1.
The code. Let B = 60, B∗ = 1.43¯B = 86, η = 11000 , δout =
1
1000 . Let
m0 = max(α log(1/δout)/η,m∗0) ,
where α is a sufficiently large constant and where m∗0 is given by Corollary 6. Let out > 0
be small enough such that the alphabet Σ, given by Theorem 7 with  = out and δ = δout,
satisfies |Σ| ≥ m0, and let Cout be the corresponding code.
Let Cin : |Σ| → {0, 1}m be the code given by Corollary 6, and let Rin = 0.555, δin =
0.0083, and m = 1Rin log |Σ| = O(log(1/)) be the rate, tolerable deletion fraction, and block
length of the code, respectively (Rin and δin are given by Corollary 6). Each codeword of
Cin has runs of length 1 and 2 only, and each codeword starts and ends with a 1. This code
is constructed greedily.
Our code is a modified concatenated code. We encode our message as follows.
Outer Code. First, encode the message into the outer code, Cout, to obtain a word
c(out) = σ1 . . . σn.
Concatenation with Inner Code. Encode each outer codeword symbol σi ∈ Σ by the inner
code Cin.
Buffer. Insert a buffer of ηm 0s between adjacent inner codewords. Let the resulting
word be c(cat). Let c(in)i = Cin(σi) denote the encoded inner codewords of c(cat).
Duplication. After concatenating the codes and inserting the buffers, replace each
character (including characters in the buffers) with dB/(1− p)e copies of itself to obtain
a word of length N := Bnm/(1− p). Let the resulting word be c, and the corresponding
inner codewords be {c(dup)i }.
Rate. The rate of the outer code is 1− δout − out, the rate of the inner code is Rin, the
buffer and duplications multiply the rate by 11+η and (1− p)/B respectively. This gives a
total rate that is slightly greater than (1− p)/110.
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Notation. Let s denote the received word after the codeword c is passed through the
deletion channel. Note that (i) every bit of c can be identified with a bit in c(cat), and (ii)
each bit in the received word s can be identified with a bit in c. Thus, we can define relations
f (dup) : c(cat) → c, and f (del) : c→ s (that is, relations on the indices of the strings). These
are not functions because some bits may be mapped to multiple (for f (dup)) or zero (for
f (del)) bits. Specifically, f (del) and f (dup) are the inverses of total functions. In this way,
composing these relations (i.e. composing their inverse functions) if necessary, we can speak
about the image and pre-image of bits or subwords of one of c(cat), c, and s under these
relations. For example, during the Duplication step of encoding, a bit 〈bj〉 of c(cat) is replaced
with B/(1− p) copies of itself, so the corresponding string 〈bj〉B/(1−p) in c forms the image
of 〈bj〉 under f (dup), and conversely the pre-image of the duplicated string 〈bj〉B/(1−p) is that
bit 〈bj〉.
Decoding algorithm
Decoding Buffer. First identify all runs of 0s in the received word with length at least
Bηm/2. These are our decoding buffers that divide the word into decoding windows,
which we identify with subwords of s.
Deduplication. Divide each decoding window into runs. For each run, if it has strictly
more than B∗ copies of a bit, replace it with as two copies of that bit, otherwise replace
it with one copy. For example, 〈0〉2B gets replaced with 〈00〉 while 〈0〉B gets replaced
with 〈0〉. For each decoding window, concatenate these runs of length 1 and 2 in their
original order in the decoding window to produce a deduplicated decoding window.
Inner Decoding. For each deduplicated decoding window, decode an outer symbol σ ∈ Σout
from each decoding window by running the brute force deletion correction algorithm for
Cin. That is, for each deduplicated decoding window s(in)∗ , find by brute force a codeword
c
(in)
∗ in Cin that such that ∆i/d(c(in)∗ , s(in)∗ ) ≤ δinm. If c(in)∗ is not unique or does not
exist, do not decode an outer symbol σ from this decoding window. Concatenate the
decoded symbols σ in the order in which their corresponding decoding windows appear
in the received word s to obtain a word s(out).
Outer Decoding. Decode the message m from s(out) using the decoding algorithm of Cout
in Theorem 7.
For purposes of analysis, label as s(dup)i the decoding window whose pre-image under f (del)
contains indices in c(dup)i . If this decoding window is not unique (that is, the image of c
(dup)
i
contains bits in multiple decoding windows), then assign s(dup)i arbitrarily. Note this labeling
may mean some decoding windows are unlabeled, and also that some decoding windows may
have multiple labels. In our analysis, we show both occurrences are rare. For a decoding
window s(dup)i , denote the result of s
(dup)
i after Deduplication to be s
(in)
i .
The following diagram depicts the encoding and decoding steps.
The pair ({c(in)i }i, c(cat)) indicates that, at that step of encoding, we have produced the
word c(cat), and the sequence {c(in)i }i are the “inner codewords” of c(cat) (that is, the words in
between what would be identified by the decoder as decoding buffers). The pair ({c(dup)i }i, c)
is used similarly.
m
Cout−−−→ c(out) Cin,Buf−−−−−−→
({
c
(in)
i
}
i
, c(cat)
)
Dup−−−→
({
c
(dup)
i
}
i
, c
)
s
DeBuf−−−−−→
{
s
(dup)
i
}
i
DeDup−−−−−→
{
s
(in)
i
}
i
Decin−−−−→ s(out) Decout−−−−→ m
BDC
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Runtime. The outer code is constructible in poly(n) time and the inner code is constructible
in time O(21.25m) = poly(1/), which is a constant, so the total construction time is poly(N).
Encoding in the outer code is linear time, each of the n inner encodings is constant time,
and adding the buffers and applying duplications each can be done in linear time. The overall
encoding time is thus O(N).
The Buffer step of the decoding takes linear time. The Deduplication step of each inner
codeword takes constant time, so the entire step takes linear time. For each inner codeword,
Inner Decoding takes time O(m22m) = poly(1/) by brute force search over the 2m possible
codewords: checking each of the 2m codewords is a longest common subsequence computation
and thus takes time O(m2), giving a total decoding time of O(m22m) for each inner codeword.
We need to run this inner decoding O(n) times, so the entire Inner Decoding step takes linear
time. The Outer Decoding step takes O(n2) time by Theorem 7. Thus the total decoding
time is O(N2).
Correctness. Note that, if an inner codeword is decoded incorrectly, then one of the following
holds.
1. Spurious Buffer. A spurious decoding buffer is identified in the corrupted codeword
during the Buffer step.
2. Deleted Buffer. A decoding buffer neighboring the codeword is deleted.
3. Inner Decoding Failure. Running the Deduplication and Inner Decoding steps on s(dup)i
computes the inner codeword incorrectly.
We show that, with high probability, the number of occurrences of each of these events is
small.
The last case is the most nontrivial, so we deal with it first, assuming the codeword
contains no spurious decoding buffers and the neighboring decoding buffers are not deleted.
In particular, we consider an i such that our decoding window s(dup)i whose pre-image under
f (del) only contains bits in c(dup)i (because no deleted buffer) and no bits in the image of
c
(dup)
i appear in any other decoding window (because no spurious buffer).
Recall that the inner code Cin can correct against δin = 0.0083 fraction of adversarial
insertions and deletions. Suppose an inner codeword c(in)i = r1 . . . rk ∈ Cin has k runs rj
each of length 1 or 2, so that m/2 ≤ k ≤ m.
I Definition 8. A subword of α identical bits in the received word s is
type-0 if α = 0,
type-1 if α ∈ [1, B∗],
type-2 if α ∈ [B∗ + 1,∞).
By abuse of notation, we say that a length 1 or 2 run rj of the inner codeword c(in)i has
type-tj if the image of rj in s under f (del) ◦ f (dup) forms a type-tj subword.
Let t1, . . . , tk be the types of the runs r1, . . . , rk, respectively. The image of a run rj
under f (del) ◦ f (dup) has length distributed as Binomial(B|rj |/(1− p), 1− p). Let δ = 0.43¯
be such that B∗ = (1 + δ)B. By the Chernoff bounds in Lemma 2, the probability that a
run rj of length 1 is type-2 is
Pr
Z∼Binomial(B/(1−p),1−p)
[Z > B∗] <
(
eδ/(1 + δ)1+δ
)B
< 0.0071. (5)
Similarly, the probability that a run rj of length-2 is type-1 is at most
Pr
Z∼Binomial(2B/(1−p),1−p)
[Z ≤ B∗] < e−((1−δ)/2)2B < 0.0081. (6)
The probability any run is type-0 is at most PrZ∼Binomial(B/(1−p),1−p)[Z = 0] < e−B < 10−10.
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We now have established that, for runs rj in c(in)i , the probability that the number of
bits in the image of rj in s under f (del) ◦ f (dup) is “incorrect” (between 1 and B∗ for length 2
runs, and greater than B∗ for length 1 runs), is at most 0.0081, which is less than δin. If the
only kinds of errors in the Local Decoding step were runs of c of length 1 becoming runs of
length 2 and runs of length 2 become runs of length 1, then we have that, by concentration
bounds, with probability 1− 2−Ω(m), the number of insertions deletions needed to transform
s
(in)
i back into c
(in)
i is at most δinm, in which case s
(in)
i gets decoded to the correct outer
symbol using Cin.
However, we must also account for the fact that some runs rj of c(in)i may become deleted
completely after duplication and passing through the deletion channel. That is, the image
of rj in s under f (del) ◦ f (dup) is empty, or, in other words, rj is type-0. In this case the
two neighboring runs rj−1 and rj+1 appear merged together in the Deduplication step of
decoding. For example, if a run of 1s was deleted completely after duplication and deletion,
its neighboring runs of 0s would be interpreted by the decoder as a single run. Fortunately,
as we saw, the probability that a run is type-0 is extremely small (< 10−10), and we show
each type-0 run only increases ∆i/d(c(in)i , s
(in)
i ) by a constant. We show this constant is at
most 6.
To be precise, let Yj be a random variable that is 0 if |rj | = tj , 1 if {|rj |, tj} = {1, 2},
and 6 if tj = 0. We claim
∑k
j=1 Yj is an upper bound on ∆i/d(c
(in)
i , s
(in)
i ). To see this, first
note that if tj 6= 0 for all i, then the number of runs of c(in)i and s(in)i are equal, so we can
transform c(in)i into s
(in)
i by adding a bit to each length-1 type-2 run of c
(in)
i and deleting a
bit from each length-2 type-1 run of s(in)i .
Now, if some number, `, of the tj are 0, then at most 2` of the runs in c(in)i become
merged with some other run (or a neighboring decoding buffer) after duplication and
deletion. Each set of consecutive runs rj , rj+2, . . . , rj+2j′ that are merged after duplication
and deletion gets replaced with 1 or 2 copies of the corresponding bit. For example, if
r1 = 〈11〉, r2 = 〈0〉, r3 = 〈11〉, and if after duplication and deletion, 2B bits remain in the
image of each of r1 and r3, and r2 is type-0, then the image of r1r2r3 under f (del) ◦ f (dup)
is 〈1〉4B , which gets decoded as 〈11〉 in the Deduplication step because 〈1〉4B is type-2. To
account for the type-0 runs in transforming c(in)i into s
(in)
i , we (i) delete at most two bits
from each of the ` type-0 runs in c(in)i and (ii) delete at most two bits for each of at most 2`
merged runs in c(in)i . The total number of additional insertions and deletions required to
account for type-0 runs of c is thus at most 6`, so we need at most 6 insertions and deletions
to account for each type-0 run.
Our analysis covers the case when some bits in the image of c(in)i under f (del) ◦ f (dup) are
interpreted as part of a decoding buffer. Recall that inner codewords start and end with
a 1, so that r1 ∈ {〈1〉, 〈11〉} for every inner codeword. If, for example, t1 = 0, that is, the
image under f (del) ◦ f (dup) of the first run of 1s, r1, is the empty string, then the bits of r2
are interpreted as part of the decoding buffer. In this case too, our analysis tells us that the
type-0 run r1 increases ∆i/d(c(in)i , s
(in)
i ) by at most 6.
We conclude
∑k
j=1 Yj is an upper bound for ∆i/d(c
(in)
i , s
(in)
i ).
Note that if rj has length 1, then by (5) we have
E[Yj ] = 1 ·Pr[rj is type-2] + 6 ·Pr[rj is type-0] < 1 · 0.0071 + 6 · 10−9 < 0.0082. (7)
Similarly, if rj has length 2, then by (6) we have
E[Yj ] = 1 ·Pr[rj is type-1] + 6 ·Pr[rj is type-0] < 1 · 0.0081 + 6 · 10−9 < 0.0082. (8)
Venkatesan Guruswami and Ray Li 47:9
Thus E[Yj ] < 0.0082 for all i. We know the word s(in)i is decoded incorrectly (i.e. is not
decoded as σi) in the Inner Decoding step only if ∆i/d(c(in)i , s
(in)
i ) > δinm. The Yj are
independent, so Lemma 3 gives
Pr[s(in)i decoded incorrectly] ≤ Pr[Y1 + Y2 + · · ·+ Yk ≥ δinm]
≤ Pr[Y1 + Y2 + · · ·+ Yk ≥ δink]
≤ exp
(
− (δin − 0.0082)
2k
3 · 6 · δin
)
≤ exp (−Ω(m)) (9)
where the last inequality is given by k ≥ m/2. Since our m ≥ Ω(log(1/δout)) is sufficiently
large, we have the probability s(in)i is decoded incorrectly is at most δout/10. If we let Y
(i)
j
denote the Yj corresponding to inner codeword c(in)i , the events Ei given by
∑
j Y
(i)
j ≥ δinm
are independent. By concentration bounds on the events Ei, we conclude the probability
that there are at least δoutn/9 incorrectly decoded inner codewords that are not already
affected by spurious buffers and neighboring deleted buffers is 2−Ω(n).
Our aim is to show that the number of spurious buffers, deleted buffers, and inner decoding
failures is small with high probability. So far, we have shown that, with high probability,
assuming a codeword is not already affected by spurious buffers and neighboring deleted
buffers, the number of inner decoding failures is small. We now turn to showing the number
of spurious buffers is likely to be small.
A spurious buffer appears inside an inner codeword if many consecutive runs of 1s are
type-0. A spurious buffer requires at least one of the following: (i) a codeword contains a
sequence of at least ηm/5 consecutive type-0 runs of 1s, (ii) a codeword contains a sequence
of ` ≤ ηm/5 consecutive type-0 runs of 1s, such that, for the ` + 1 consecutive runs of 0s
neighboring these type-0 runs of 1s, their image under f (del) ◦ f (dup) has at least 0.5ηm 0s.
We show both happen with low probability within a codeword.
A set of ` consecutive type-0 runs of 1s occurs with probability at most 10−10`. Thus the
probability an inner codeword has a sequence of ηm/5 consecutive type-0 runs of 1s is at
most m2 · 10−10ηm/5 = exp(−Ω(ηm)). Now assume that in an inner codeword, each set of
consecutive type-0 runs of 1s has size at most ηm/5. Each set of ` consecutive type-0 runs
of 1s merges ` + 1 consecutive runs of 0s in c, so that they appear as a single longer run
in s. The sum of the lengths of these `+ 1 runs is some number `∗ that is at most 2`+ 2.
The number of bits in the image of these runs of c(in)i under f (del) ◦ f (dup) is distributed as
Binomial(`∗B/(1 − p), 1 − p). This has expectation `∗B ≤ 0.41Bηm, so by concentration
bounds, the probability this run of s has length at least 0.5Bηm, i.e. is interpreted as a
decoding buffer, is at most exp(−Ω(ηm)). Hence, conditioned on each set of consecutive type-0
runs of 1s having size at most ηm/5, the probability of having no spurious buffers in a codeword
is at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ηm)). Thus the overall probability there are no spurious buffers a
given inner codeword is at least (1− exp(−Ω(ηm))(1− exp(−Ω(ηm))) = 1− exp(−Ω(ηm)).
Since each inner codeword contains at most m candidate spurious buffers (one for each
type-0 run of 1s), the expected number of spurious buffers in an inner codeword is thus
at most m · exp(−Ω(ηm)). By our choice of m ≥ Ω(log(1/δout)/η), this is at most δout/10.
The occurrence of conditions (i) and (ii) above are independent between buffers. The total
number of spurious buffers thus is bounded by the sum of n independent random variables
each with expectation at most δout/10. By concentration bounds, the probability that there
are at least δoutn/9 spurious buffers is 2−Ω(n).
APPROX/RANDOM’17
47:10 Efficiently Decodable Codes for the Binary Deletion Channel
A deleted buffer occurs only when the image of the ηm 0s in a buffer under f (del) ◦ f (dup)
is at most Bηm/2. The number of such bits is distributed as Binomial(Bηm/(1− p), 1− p).
Thus, each buffer is deleted with probability exp(−Bηm) < δout/10 by our choice of m ≥
Ω(log(1/δout)/η). The events of a buffer receiving too many deletions are independent across
buffers. By concentration bounds, the probability that there are at least δoutn/9 deleted
buffers is thus 2−Ω(n).
Each inner decoding failure, spurious buffer, and deleted buffer increases the distance
∆i/d(c(out)i , s
(out)
i ) by at most 3: each inner decoding failure causes up to 1 insertion and
1 deletion; each spurious buffer causes up to 1 deletion and 2 insertions; and each de-
leted buffer causes up to 2 deletions and 1 insertion. Our message is decoded incorrect if
∆i/d(c(out)i , s
(out)
i ) > δoutn. Thus, there is a decoding error in the outer code only if at least
one of (i) the number of incorrectly decoded inner codewords without spurious buffers or
neighboring deleted buffers, (ii) the number of spurious buffers, or (iii) the number of deleted
buffers is at least δoutn/9. However, by the above arguments, each is greater than δoutn/9
with probability 2−Ω(n), so there is a decoding error with probability 2−Ω(n). This concludes
the proof of Theorem 1.
3.2 Possible Alternative Constructions
As mentioned in the introduction, Drinea and Mitzenmacher [4, 5] proved that the capacity
of the BDCp is at least (1− p)/9. However, their proof is nonconstructive and they do not
provide an efficient decoding algorithm.
One might think it is possible to use Drinea and Mitzenmacher’s construction as a black
box. We could follow the approach in this paper, concatenating an outer code given by [10]
with the rate (1 − p)/9 random-deletion-correcting code as a black box inner code. The
complexity of the Drinea and Mitzenmacher’s so-called jigsaw decoding is not apparent from
[5]. However, the inner code has constant length, so construction, encoding, and decoding
would be constant time. Thus, the efficiency of the inner code would not affect the asymptotic
runtime.
The main issue with this approach is that, while the inner code can tolerate random
deletions with probability p, inner codeword bits are not deleted in the concatenated
construction according to a BDCp; the 0 bits closer to the buffers between the inner
codewords are deleted with higher probability because they might be “merged” with a buffer.
For example, if an inner codeword is 〈101111〉, then because the codeword is surrounded by
buffers of 0s, deleting the leftmost 1 effectively deletes two bits because the 0 is interpreted
as part of the buffer. While this may not be a significant issue because the distributions
of deletions in this deletion process and BDCp are quite similar, much more care would be
needed to prove correctness.
Our construction does not run into this issue, because our transmitted codewords tend
to have many 1s on the ends of the inner codewords. In particular, each inner codeword of
Cin has 1s on the ends, so after the Duplication step each inner codeword has B/(1 − p)
or 2B/(1 − p) 1s on the ends. The 1s on the boundary of the inner codeword will all be
deleted with probability ≈ exp(−B), which is small. Thus, in our construction, it is far more
unlikely that bits are merged with the neighboring decoding buffer, than if we were to use
a general inner code construction. Furthermore, we believe our construction based on bit
duplication of a worst-case deletion correcting code is conceptually simpler than appealing
to an existential code.
As a remark, we presented a construction with rate (1− p)/110, but using a randomized
encoding we can improve the constant from 1/110 to 1/60. We can modify our construction
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so that, during the Duplication step of decoding, instead of replacing each bit of c(cat) with
a fix number B/(1 − p) copies of itself, we instead replaced each bit independently with
Poisson(B/(1−p)) copies of itself. Then the image of a run rj under duplication and deletion
is distributed as Poisson(B), which is independent of p. Because we don’t have a dependence
on p, we can tighten our bounding in (5) and (6). To obtain (1−p)/60, we can take B = 28.12
and set B∗ = 40, where B∗ is the threshold after which runs are decoded as two bits instead
of one bit in the Deduplication step. The disadvantage of this approach is that we require
our encoding to be randomized, whereas the construction presented above uses deterministic
encoding.
4 Future work and open questions
A lemma due to Levenshtein [15] states that a code C can decode against pn adversarial
deletions if and only if it can decode against pn adversarial insertions and deletions. While
this does not automatically preserve the efficiency of the decoding algorithms, all the recent
efficient constructions of codes for worst-case deletions also extend to efficient constructions
with similar parameters for recovering from insertions and deletions [1, 7].
In the random error model, decoding deletions, insertions, and insertions and deletions
are not the same. Indeed, it is not even clear how to define random insertions. One could
define insertions and deletions via the Poisson repeat channel where each bit is replaced with
a Poisson many copies of itself (see [4, 17]). However, random insertions do not seem to
share the similarity to random deletions that adversarial deletions share with adversarial
insertions; we can decode against arbitrarily large Poisson duplication rates, whereas for
codes of block length n we can decode against a maximum of n adversarial insertions or
deletions [5]. Alternatively one can consider a model of random insertions and deletions
where, for every bit, the bit is deleted with a fixed probability p1, a bit is inserted after
it with a fixed probability p2, or it is transmitted unmodified with probability 1− p1 − p2
[19]. One could also investigate settings involving memoryless insertions, deletions, and
substitutions [16].
There remain a number of open questions even concerning codes for deletions only. Here
are a few highlighted by this work.
1. Can we close the gap between
√
2 − 1 and 12 on the maximum correctable fraction of
adversarial deletions?
2. Can we construct efficiently decodable codes for the binary deletion channel with better
rate, perhaps reaching or beating the best known existential capacity lower bound of
(1− p)/9?
3. Can we construct efficient codes for the binary deletion channel with rate 1−O(h(p)) for
p→ 0?
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A Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For each i, we can find a random variable Bi such that Bi ≥ Ai always, Bi takes
values in [0, β], and E[Bi] = α. Applying Lemma 2 gives
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Ai ≥ nγ
]
≤ Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Bi ≥ nγ
]
≤ Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Bi
β
≥
(
1 +
(
γ − α
α
))
nα
β
]
≤ exp
−(γ−αα )2 · nαβ3

= exp
(
− (γ − α)
2n
3αβ
)
. J
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